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In Love: An Unromantic Discussion, Mary Evans offers a powerful demystification of contemporary 
western romantic love. An exercise in sociohistorical analysis and normative theorizing, the book 
explores the meanings of (primarily heterosexual) love at the start of the 21st century, and poses the 
question: ‘Dare we entertain the idea of a world without love and could another vocabulary, in 
which words such as care, commitment and desire were more often used, actually make us 
happier?’ (Evans, 2003: 2). 
Her conclusion is to propose that ‘we abandon love in its romanticized and commercialized form’ 
and that ‘[r]ather than regarding the rational as the cold and uncaring enemy of love, we might well 
regard it as its only true defender in a social world awash with deadly cocktails of romance, 
hedonism and personal entitlement’ (p. 143). 
The argument for this rests on an analysis of what she regards as the societally destabilizing 
contemporary understanding of love ‘in terms of romance, of sexual desire and above all of a 
lifelong entitlement to both experiences’ (p. 123). The emergence of romantic love, the liberalization 
of sex and the availability of contraception have offered women greater choice within heterosexual 
relationships, but these same forces have increased the instability of these relationships, with 
negative consequences for both the individuals concerned and for their children – ‘a chaos of 
generations whose needs for undemanding and unequivocal love have never been met, and who 
need to turn either to the market place for emotional satisfaction or to that apparently safe haven of 
single life’ (p. 130). Love has been ‘deconstructed’ into sex and romance, and it has been removed 
‘from any close or necessary association with any form of social relationship’ (p. 78). People expect 
more, she suggests, in the sphere of love, as they do in the spheres of paidwork and consumption, 
and this leads to relationship breakdown, with consequent ‘cruelty and pain’, ‘losses and absences’ 
(p. 135); and ‘in expecting more’, she suggests, ‘we are perhaps gaining less’ (p. 135). In particular, 
our obsession with our individual pursuit of romance and sex is turning us away from social 
engagement. Mary’s answer to the problems caused by this particular sociohistorical construction of 
love is to advocate a return to the deployment of reason in the realm of personal life that was 
exemplified in the novels of Jane Austen. Austen was highly critical of the romantic, regarding 
superficial forms of attraction in love relationships as transient and insufficient as the basis of ‘long 
termconjugal happiness’ (p. 77). Instead she saw ‘themutual power to reason’ as the ground from 
which love could grow: ‘The step forward whichAusten makes is to claim the rationality of women 
and to suggest that sexuality (and marriage) can be conducted in a way which allows both sexual 
desire and rationality’ (p. 34). So, Mary argues, we should relinquish love in its current form – 
romantic and individualized, with its lack of long-term commitment to the couple – and we should 
engage rationality to promote a version of love which recognizes the limitations of romance, and 
understands that love requires work and application. Without seeking to defend the mode of love 
that Mary critiques, and without denying the psychic consequences of processes of individualization, 
and relationship breakdown in particular (for discussion of this, see Roseneil, 2007; Roseneil, 
forthcoming), I want to suggest an alternative agenda for feminists concerned with the politics and 
practices of personal life, one that does not share Mary’s Enlightenment belief in the power of 
reason to overcome the vicissitudes of affective life. Drawing on the work  of Ken Plummer (2003), I 
define this agenda as the project of ‘intimate citizenship’. My proposal rests on both a different 
sociohistorical analysis of personal life fromMary’s, pointing to new forms of relationality which are 
emerging in the early 21st century, and is predicated on different ontological assumptions about 
love and intimacy from Mary’s work. While Mary clearly recognizes the gains of the women’s 
liberation movement and the post-1960s liberalization of sexuality and is deeply concerned about 
the inequalities that still characterize heterosexual relationships, which differentiates her work from 
the ‘patriarchal pessimists’ (Roseneil, 2007) - Zygmunt Bauman (2001, 2003), Robert Putnam (2000) 
and Richard Sennett (1998) - she shares with them, and with feminist sociologists Arlie 
Hochschild (2003) and Eva Illouz (2007), a critical lamentation about the demoralizing, anomic 
impact of the individualization and commercialization of the past three decades on love and 
intimacy, community and social bonds. My normative agenda is radically opposed to theirs, rejecting 
the implicit nostalgia for earlier ways of living and loving that is found, in varying ways, in the 
writings of these sociologists. There is, I would suggest, a pessimistic puritan sensibility inMary’swork 
– capturedwell in her description of the contemporary world as ‘awash with deadly cocktails of 
romance, hedonism and personal entitlement’ (p. 143). Yet there is also a modernist optimism at the 
heart of her proposal for rational love, a belief that if done correctly – rationally – if disentangled 
from romance, the pursuit of sexual pleasure and a sense of personal entitlement, love can be 
settled and secured, and need not be chaotic. I do not share this belief. First, in terms of the analysis 
of social change, I do not think that there is any possibility of turning the clock back on 
themultifarious transformations of culture, economics, law and social policy that, since the 1960s, 
have enabled women and men to exit in ever increasing numbers the modern Western European–
North American heterosexual nuclear family. Mary and I are agreed that the conjugal couple is 
increasingly fragile, and we both see the normative grip of the sexual and gender order which has 
underpinned both the institutions of the couple and its related family formation to be weakening. 
But thereafter our analyses diverge. My recent research on the personal lives of people living 
outside the cohabiting couple – people who might be seen to be at the cutting edge of 
individualization – suggests that there is little desire among this diverse group (of heterosexuals, 
lesbians and gay men, single-and-never married, divorced, post-cohabitation and livingapart- 
together) to settle into a(nother) cohabiting dyad. Where Mary sees people ‘pursu[ing] “love” with 
unstinting enthusiasm’ (p. 22), I see increasing scepticism about the romantically based sexual/love 
relationship. 
Rather, I argue that a set of counter-heteronormative relationship practices is emerging among this 
increasingly large group of the population, in which sexual/love relationships are decentred, and 
friendship is prioritized, and which involve, for many, experimentations with non-conventional forms 
of sexual/love relationships (see Roseneil, 2006a, 2006b, 2007; Roseneil, forthcoming; Roseneil and 
Budgeon, 2004). The research found that, across a range of lifestyles, ages and sexualities, friendship 
occupied a central place in people’s personal lives, and operated as key value and site of ethical 
practice; people believed in the importance of friendship, both in principle and in their own 
particular friendships. There was a high degree of reliance on friends, as opposed to biological kin 
and sexual partners, particularly for the provision of care and support in everyday life. Most of the 
people interviewed were enmeshed in complex and relatively stable networks of friendship, through 
which they had strong commitments and connections to others. In this context, sexual/love 
relationships were rarely seen as the primary, and never the exclusive, space of intimacy, and there 
was little evidence of a teleological assumption of, or orientation towards, settled, cohabiting 
coupledomwithin the sexual/love relationships in which people were engaged. Rather these 
intimacies were described instead as being about the construction of mutual pleasure in the present. 
On this basis, I would suggest that the heteronormative couplets of love and romance, romance and 
sex, coupledom and sex, coupledom and cohabitation are being destabilized, as people articulate 
the love they have for their friends, the sexual relationships they value that are outside the romantic 
couple form and the partnerships in which they live that involve separate homes. These new forms 
of personal life pose a significant challenge to the dominant regimes of gender and sexuality, and in 
this sense can be seen as societally destabilizing, but they do not necessarily mean that people are 
becoming less socially engaged, as Mary suggests. On the contrary, the decline in emphasis on the 
cohabiting couple, and the increasing importance of friendship to the growing portion of the 
population who are living outside conventional families, might well be seen as heralding 
new forms of sociality and sociability, rather than signalling the demise of community and social 
bonds. In sum, I would argue that these complex social transformations should not be viewed as 
negatively as Mary and many sociologists do, and, because they are rooted in long-term processes 
of social, cultural and economic change, they cannot be undone by a decision to embrace a new 
form of rational heterosexual love. In addition, ontologically I do not believe that love can be remade 
in the way in which Mary proposes. A psychoanalytic perspective on love rejects the assumption that 
we might ever be entirely rational, conscious and volitional in our love relationships, and suggests 
instead the importance of unconscious processes which mean that we do not totally know and 
understand ourselves and our actions, that we are mysterious to ourselves and others (Bollas, 1999), 
that our personhood is not unitary and that internal conflict, being divided within ourselves, is an 
unavoidable dimension of being human. Psychoanalysis suggests that human subjectivity and 
relations are characterized by ambivalence, by the struggle between love and hate, destructive and 
reparative impulses, and that aggression, envy and guilt are unavoidable dimensions of the human 
condition. As Leo Bersani and Adam Phillips have argued recently, ‘the great achievement of 
psychoanalysis [is] its attempt to account for our inability to love others, and ourselves. The 
promises of adaptive balance and sexual maturity undoubtedly explain the appeal of psychoanalysis 
as therapy, but its greatness may lie in its insistence on a human destructiveness resistant to any 
therapeutic endeavours whatsoever’ (Bersani and Phillips, 2008: 60). So, while Freud’s famous 
dictum ‘Wo Es war, soll Ich werden’ (Where id was, shall ego be) suggests the psychoanalytic 
therapeutic project of displacing the unruly, disorderly, instinctual (Es/id) aspects of the psyche, in 
favour of the development of the rational self (Ich/ego), psychoanalytic theory and practice attest 
to the ultimate impossibility of the final achievement of this task. From a psychoanalytic perspective, 
Mary’s condemnation of ‘a social world awash with deadly cocktails of romance, hedonismand 
personal entitlement’ reads like a condemnation of human nature, of that from which we cannot 
escape by rational, self-reflexive fiat or political decision-making. ‘Romance’ – the expression of the 
human desire for attachment and sexual union with another; ‘hedonism’ – the expression of the 
pleasure principle, our attraction to pleasurable experiences; and ‘personal entitlement’ – the 
assertion of the self, of the ego, and its defence against the forceswhich impinge upon it and 
threaten it, the expression of the self-preservative instinct – are all part of whatmakes us human. 
This is not to say that the cultural forms taken by the desire for attachment and sexual union, by 
pleasure and by self-preservation do not change historically in importantways, and don’t vary cross-
culturally, and it is not to deny that commercialization and individualization have wrought significant 
changes in how we live these aspects of our humanity. But Mary’s call to defend ourselves against 
romance, hedonism and personal entitlement seems to me to amount to a call for us to be less alive, 
less fully human, and is destined to fail.We should, as Bersani and Phillips (2008: 98) argue, ‘wish for 
more life rather than less’. Rather than abandoning sexuality, pleasure and self-preservation, and 
seeking to replace them with rational love, ‘care, commitment and desire’ (Evans, p. 2) – as if care, 
commitment and desire were unconflictual and unconflicted practices, my proposal is that we 
should abandon our collective, public and political investments in the life-long, monogamous couple, 
as the source of our hopes and expectations of social stability, relational continuity and personal 
companionship. This proposal is based on an acknowledgement of recent transformations in 
personal life, a queer feminist analysis of the ways in which these changes constitute a significant 
shift in the heteronormative social order and a psychoanalytic perspective on the inevitability of 
instability, disorder and disruption within sexual/love relationships. Instead of seeking to remake 
love as a rational enterprise, in order to resettle the couple form, it would be better to develop a 
political agenda that seeks to minimize the harm our unruly psyches and changing relationships 
inflict upon our selves and others. This project would aim to promote the freedom and ability to 
construct and live selfhood and a wide range of close relationships – sexual/love relationships, 
friendships, parental and kin relations – safely, securely and according to personal choice, in their 
dynamic, changing forms, with respect, recognition and support from state and civil society. Such a 
politics of intimate citizenship would offer, I suggest, a pragmatic yet radical agenda for feminism in 
the early 21st century. 
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